Procedural Posture
Defendant real estate broker appealed a postjudgment order from the Superior Court of Sonoma County (California), which awarded attorney fees to plaintiff seller as the prevailing party in a dispute concerning a real estate transaction and denied the broker's motion for attorney fees.
Overview
The seller asked the broker to obtain security from the buyer of her retail business, which the broker failed to do. The buyer subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection, and a portion of the purchase price went unpaid. The parties' listing agreement contained an attorney fee provision that provided for mediation of any dispute prior to litigation and for an award of costs and fees to the prevailing party. The trial court awarded damages to the seller on a negligence cause of action, while also finding that the broker had not breached the contract. The court held that the parties had agreed under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021, to an attorney fee provision encompassing tort claims because the broad wording of the provision applied to "any dispute." Accordingly, the definition of a prevailing party in an action on a contract under Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b), did not govern the trial court's prevailing party determination. The seller was the prevailing party under the general cost provisions in Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b), 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A), because the seller obtained a net recovery in her action against the broker.
Outcome
The court affirmed the order.
Procedural Posture
Plaintiff appealed a nonsuit judgment by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), in an action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract by unauthorized use of a writer's script, and summary judgment for defendants in an action for common law copyright infringement as preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. § 301. The appellants had advocates that were small business attorney San Diego.
Overview
Plaintiff appealed a judgment of nonsuit in its action alleging defendants breached an implied-in-fact contract by their unauthorized use of a writer's unpublished movie script that plaintiff was promoting to film producers, and summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's action for common law copyright infringement. The court affirmed. While abstract ideas were protectable in California by express or implied-in-fact contracts, ideas could not be segmented into varying rights and separately assigned. The court held that an implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and the writer was effective only between them. The court affirmed trial court's holding that § 301 of Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.S. § 301, preempted plaintiff's common law infringement action. After January 1, 1978, rights entitled to protection under the Copyright Act were to be governed exclusively by that Act. The court held that the relevant date for determining preemption was the date of the unauthorized use, and since defendants' unauthorized use took place after January 1, 1978, plaintiff's common law infringement action was preempted.
Outcome
The court affirmed, holding that creation of an implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and the writer was effective only between the parties. The relevant date for determining preemption under the federal Copyright Act was the date of unauthorized use, and since defendants' unauthorized use took place after January 1, 1978, plaintiff's common law infringement action was preempted.